Hermeneutical Reflections on Mathematical Significance by Husain, Hafiz Syed
 
Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science & Technology        Philosophical Readings XII.2 (2020), pp. 331-335. 
Karachi, Pakistan               DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3865590 
email: hsyed.hussain@fuuast.edu.pk 
 
Hermeneutical Reflections on Mathematical Significance 
 
Hafiz Syed Husain 
 
 
Abstract: This paper aims to investigate the meaning of 
mathematics in context of its applicability. Realism and 
Nominalism as dominant traditional ways of philosophiz-
ing are critically analyzed with the end of working out the 
problematics that would lead to the priority of the ques-
tion of applicability over abstract theorizing about meta-
physical existence of mathematical entities. An answer to 
the question of applicability will be examined to the ex-
tent which would lead to an analogy with historical prac-
tices of classical philology. Interpretive historical inquiry 
will be made to further extend analogy between the role 
of mathematics in context of its descriptive applicability 
in natural sciences, and the role of Dilthey’s hermeneutics 
as universal methodology for human sciences. The pur-
pose of this investigation is to enrich conventional con-
ceptions of mathematics within the sphere of mathematics 
education to incorporate a possibility of a hermeneutic 
approach to mathematical pedagogy. 
 
Keywords: Hermeneutics, Realism, Nominalism, Philol-
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1. Introduction: Metaphysical Problematics of 
Realism vs. Nominalism 
  
Any investigation about the reference or meaning of 
mathematical entities and their systematic relationship 
traditionally involves taking at least either a realist or a 
nominalist stance. As model example, one can take Pla-
tonism as realism1 which amounts to a doctrine that ad-
mits the independent existence of mathematical objects 
and their systematic relation (Dummet, 1991, p. 301). 
Then nominalism can simply be its opposite that denies 
such an independent existence. However, there are excep-
tions or significant deviations from these two. For in-
stance, Brower’s intuitionism shouldn’t be classified as 
being either a realist or nominalist. On the other hand 
Hilbert’s formalistic approach can be given a nominalistic 
twist by showing how it can help in nominalizing physical 
theories (Fields, 2016, p. 42ff)   
Most of these traditional philosophical debates revolve 
around the nature of existence of mathematical objects 
and the possibility of working out the minimal conditions 
that can render statements about them to be true. Thus, 
most of these philosophical considerations either ignore 
or take the problem of applicability of mathematics only 
derivatively. On the other hand, as far as phenomenologi-
cal aspect of the use of mathematics in theoretic sciences 
(especially theoretical physics) is concerned, as Mark 
Steiner rightly identifies with reference to some of the 
most respectable physicists of our times, the situation is 
quite the opposite (Steiner, 1998, p. 13ff). It was in this 
context that a debate started with Quine and Putnam (both 
as Platonists) about the essential indispensability of math-
ematics for science reached its pivot when Hartry Field 
provocatively denied this indispensability with his nomi-
nalistic account, which can be dubbed representational 
fictionalism, of how mathematics is applicable. Accord-
ing to this, mathematical theories are very much like fic-
tions which help represent the world and thus constitute 
one among many options for describing it (Field, 1989). 
However, neither any version of Platonic realism satisfac-
torily answers the problem of applicability nor any nomi-
nalist account sufficiently explains how mathematics 
helps render naturalistic theoretic explanations possible. 
Their mutual critiques as outlined by Mark Balaguer 
reaches a dilemma: whether abstract entities exist or they 
don’t exist, which requires a hermeneutic2 turn to the 
problem of determining the meaning of mathematics (Ba-
laguer, 1998). It seems that any further engagement 
within the paradigms of realism or nominalism is ineffec-
tive and cannot provide a way out of the dilemma. Thus I 
propose that we may be asking the wrong sort of question. 
In order for mathematical activity to make sense, one 
shouldn’t be asking anything about the nature of existence 
of mathematical entities. 
 
 
2. On Descriptive Applicability of Mathematics 
 
When the debate between nominalism and realism is 
pushed to its limits, I propose that the most fruitful point 
of contention is not the nature of existence of abstract 
mathematical objects (e.g. points, sets, numbers, …etc.) 
but the question of indispensability of mathematics in 
context of its application. This shift of focus is concomi-
tant with author’s hermeneutic and phenomenological 
convictions which prioritize interpretation and description 
over abstract theorizing, for it is in the use of mathematics 
(both inside and outside of mathematics) that one should 
start questioning the very sense of what mathematics is all 
about instead of first trying to seek the foundational in-
sights through regional ontology and then help make 
sense of mathematical activity. Both Steiner and Fields3 
realize the significance of this shift of focus. Both reach, 
however covertly, towards the hermeneutic turn that I in-
tend to propose, but without actually making the turn. 
Fields attempts to see mathematical theories as fictions by 
nominalizing both physical and mathematical theories 
using conservative principle (which I find a modern ava-
tar or interpretation of classic Okham’s razor) helps sus-
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pend the judgment about an independent metaphysical 
existence of mathematical realm that has a deep craving 
in our natural attitude towards the meaning of mathemat-
ics. However, the suspension is not sufficient and requires 
a force to counter the possibility of its own nominalist 
residue.4 Steiner’s identification of seeing mathematical 
applications in theoretic physics with covert-overt anthro-
pocentric values to the extent that mathematics becomes a 
particular anthropocentrism, i.e., a way of privileging 
human perspective, has interpretive (thus hermeneutic) 
underpinnings which can suffice for the above suspension 
of judgment that I find a phenomenological requirement 
to shift towards the proposed turn. According to him, 
what characterizes a mathematical activity is ultimately 
not some kind of Fregean semantics but beauty and con-
venience (Steiner, 1998, pp. 17, 15, 72ff, 115).  On the 
other hand, his account of nth-order formalist and non-
formalist Pythagorean mathematical analogy5 in context 
of most of the modern applications in theoretical physics, 
which he classified under the rubric of Pythagoreanism, 
seems to have close parallels with interpretive schemata 
as practiced in classical philology, though the latter had 
the aim to identify authentic from inauthentic texts in 
classical Greek literature, besides being an aid to recon-
cile conflicting interpretations (Dilthey, 1996b). In order 
to argue this parallelism,6 first consider Steiner’s ac-
count.7 It roughly amounts to a relationship R known to 
be existent between two mathematical objects (or struc-
tures), say X1 and X2. Suppose, there are two physical ob-
jects (or phenomena), say Y1 and Y2, already known to be 
physical interpretations of X1 and X2 respectively. Then 
even if there is no physical warrant of any physical rela-
tionship between Y1 and Y2, a warrant would be imposed 
as a physical avatar of R. In fact, even if there is no 
known Y2 as a physical interpretation of X2, a physical 
interpretation can be conjectured as natural entity or phe-
nomenon to exist that would hold a similar relation R be-
tween Y1 and Y2. Steiner’s historical account of Max-
well’s ‘displacement current’ facilitated such a warrant to 
explain and predict Maxwell’s electromagnetic radiation. 
Similarly, on philological side, in order to resolve the 
conflict of interpretation over authorial intention and the 
authenticity of authorship, both Zenodotus and later 
Aristarchus as pioneers of Alexandrian School of classical 
philology, devised the instrument of principle of analogy 
aimed at interpreting and authenticating Homeric and He-
siodic canons. Its exact reconstruction is still difficult to 
interpret (Peck, 1911, pp. 98-117).8 But it roughly 
amounts to determining the authenticity of the text (or a 
historical authorship of the text) as the proposed relation-
ship that has to be presupposed between a stream of 
authorial intentions behind every utterance which is pres-
umed to follow from the regularity of language within the 
texts of multiple manuscripts. Here, the Xi’s are the tex-
tual utterances (verses of poems for instance), R is the 
regularity of language between them, Yi’s are the corres-
ponding authorial intentions behind every Xi and thus the 
avatar of this R is the unity of consciousness which is 
sought as the historical authorship. This helped build can-
ons (manuals to exemplify the excellence of poetic geni-
uses) from Alexandrian School for Homer’s Iliad and 
Odyssey on one hand, and Hesiod’s Theogony on the 
other (Peck, 1911, p. 99ff). Alexandrian philology be-
came the taxonomy, i.e., the classifying scheme of literary 
entities and phenomena and theoretical physics becomes 
the taxonomy of physical beings or phenomena. One uses 
analogy as linguistic regularity, the other uses analogy as 
Pythagoreanism. The parallelism is significant. Neither 
justifies itself on this ultimate point of the very use of an-
alogy. The epistemological foundation of theoretical 
physics as descriptive applicability of pure mathematics 
lack a sound foundation, similarly classical philology as a 
theory to resolve conflict of interpretation and historical 
authorship or authenticity of text requires a justification 
for the use of analogy-anomaly as a principle of interpre-
tation.9 This principle of analogy (and anomaly) was then 
appropriated (with critical revision) by Dilthey in his later 
hermeneutic turn that regarded human interpretation (Aus-
legung) as a rule driven aspect of human understanding 
(Verstehen) as the most fundamental human capacity re-




3. Towards an Unusual Parallelism: Mathematics vs. 
Subject-Matter of Universal Hermeneutics 
 
Thus the ultimate end product of both (i) classical philol-
ogy as regional hermeneutics via methodological princi-
ple of analogy and (ii) Pythagoreanism as anthropocen-
trism via its own formalist and non-formalist analogies is 
the same. It is the understanding embedded in classifica-
tory scheme of taxonomy. Taxonomy is the very nexus by 
virtue of which an entity is named and thus comes-to-be 
in language.10 Taxonomy is the very expression of under-
standing. Every science is such taxonomy. It is thor-
oughly linguistic and thus confirms both phenomenologi-
cal and hermeneutic thesis for the linguistic nature (lin-
guisticality) of human understanding (Verstehen). How-
ever, the nature of this linguisticality is different in natu-
ral and human sciences.11 Former is dominated by math-
ematics as language with theoretical physics as a para-
digmatic example. Latter is dominated by restricted-
natural language.12  When philology is taken as a particu-
lar human science, then this is dominated by the literari-
ness of language. This includes not only literature and all 
classical texts as its subject matter but also the human 
competence which renders it possible, i.e., the subject 
matter of both rhetoric and poetics (Verburg, 1998, p. 
17ff). So when it comes to search for a logical classifying 
scheme that can unify the two corresponding modes of 
human understanding, natural vs. human sciences, we 
have at least two possibilities; it would be either math-
ematics or the human literary competence that shows it-
self in regional hermeneutics through literary historical 
texts.  
However, before I move any further, I must answer a 
possible objection. Theoretical physics is indeed a para-
digm example for dominance of mathematics as what 
contributes in rendering the taxonomy of natural beings 
possible. But philology is not so as-such in human his-
torical world. What I am required is to work out a proper 
paradigmatic example from the domain of human sci-
ences. To this end, I would recall the classical debate of 
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Eklӓren vs. Verstehen (Explanation vs. Understanding) 
from German thought of 19th century (see (Wright, 1971) 
for detail). 
The technical distinction between Eklӓren and Verste-
hen was first introduced by J. G. Droysen in his Grun-
driss der Historik (1858) which was later adopted and ex-
tended by Wilhelm Dilthey through his Einleitung in die 
Geisteswissenschaften (1883).  If we can avoid subtleties 
then both Droysen and Dilthey’s use of the term was pri-
marily motivated by the thought of practicing philologist 
and Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher, in 
particular, his universal hermeneutics,13 to the extent that 
this use of the term coincided in at least one fundamental 
point: natural sciences has the claim to epistemological 
autonomy in the sphere of nature with their own distin-
guished methodology and human sciences (Geisteswis-
senschaften) have their own claim to epistemological au-
tonomy in the sphere of the ‘human’ with their distin-
guished methodology. Eklӓren was termed as the meth-
odology for the former whereas Verstehen was so termed 
for the latter (Apel, 1982). The model thought for Eklӓren 
could be considered as expounded in Kant’s first critique, 
i.e. the Critique of Pure Reason. Against this, Dilthey in 
particular sought to lay down the foundations for Verste-
hen through his grand project of Critique of Historical 
Reason (Dilthey, 2002). Dilthey’s pursuit of this objective 
eventually found its more comprehensive results in his 
later hermneutic works, more siginificantly The Rise of 
Hermeneutics (1900) and The Understanding of Other 
Persons and Their Expressions of Life (1910). It is in the 
latter where he explicitly works out how Verstehen actu-
ally works through his hermeneutical reflections moti-
vated by the works of Schleiermacher14. There one can 
see how he explicitly works out the graded process of 
Verstehen with strong philological underpinnings thereby 
rendering hermeneutics as the theory of Verstehen. On the 
other hand in (Dilthey, The Rise of Hermeneutics, 1996b) 
he explicitly elaborates how hermeneutics is the science 
of the individual person (in the most comprehensive and 
extended sense) and thereby establishes hermeneutics as 
what explicates the methodology for human sciences. 
Thus, it is from classical philology, through the works of 
Schleiermacher, that Dilthey works out a universal nexus 
or taxonomy for the human historical world, since what is 
responsible for explicating Verstehen should exactly be 
considered responsible for determining the sense and 
meanings in all forms of human actions. This universal 
taxonomy is Dilthey’s hermeneutics so grounded (the 
seeds of which Dilthey explicitly acknowledged in 
Schleiermacher’s universal hermeneutics, see (Dilthey, 
1996a, p. 132). As a human scientific discipline, this uni-
versality of hermeneutics makes it also the paradigm ex-
ample of human sciences. 
I had worked out the correlation between (i) how 
mathematics was dominating the taxonomical signifi-
cance of natural sciences, and (ii) how philology was the 
taxonomy for the historical world in context of literary 
text. Once latter is seen connected with Dilthey’s herme-
neutics as a universal taxonomy for the human historical 
world, we can draw a possibility of extending the correla-
tion to (iii) how history through historical texts as models 
of human actions dominates hermeneutics as universal 
taxonomy of human or historical sphere.15 This would 
help see the role of historical texts as playing the same 
role in hermeneutics that mathematics plays in the natural 
sciences in general and theoretical physics in particular. 
The difference is that mathematics, totally unlike ‘histori-
cal texts’, is recognized as a well-defined scientific disci-
pline. On contrary, ‘historical texts’ only defines the pri-
mary subject-matter of hermeneutics as human or histori-
cal scientific discipline but itself does not constitute a sci-
entific discipline in its own right. So the correlational an-
alogy seems to have an odd term in it. But the oddness is 
only apparent and superficial, for what constitutes the 
very discipline of mathematics is not some logical axio-
matic foundation from which the whole mathematics 
could be derived as logical inference. This was classical 
logicist dream pursued at the turn of twentieth century in 
the project of Principia Mathematica pioneered by A. N. 
Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. But the project failed 
once Kurt Gӧdel’s Incompleteness Theorems are acknow-
ledged, according to which any formal theory sufficiently 
complete to include Arithmetic could not prove every 
theorem stated within the very formal theory itself 
(Smornyski, 1977). Thus mathematics is not a logically 
founded scientific discipline with single set of axioms and 
rules of logical inferences. Without recourse to the institu-
tional practices of mathematics, one can’t take a cognitive 
stance over the meanings of mathematics. This does not 
mean the triviality that ‘mathematics is what mathemati-
cians do’, but only the insufficiency of a foundationalist 
sort of epistemology. This is also evident in how Saun-
ders Mac Lane16 identifies the charactering properties of 
mathematics. According to him, these are conundrums, 
completion, invariance, analogy, intrinsic structures… 
axiomatizations, etc. the list is quite long (Lane, 1986, p. 
36ff). These are merely, what Ludwig Wittgenstein may 
have called, the family resemblances within the language-
games involving mathematics. Thus it is not only 
Steiner’s account of mathematics as anthropocentrism 
with applicability of mathematics guided by his account 
of Pythagorean analogies, which is anti-foundationalist. 
Mac Lane’s account of the very practice of mathematics 
too shows that there is no singular definition or essential 
conceptualizing that can characterize the activity of math-
ematics as a particular scientific discipline. Mathematics 
has acquired such a status of an apparent scientific disci-
plinary unity because of its long historical significance. In 
particular, its role for inspiring epistemological models of 
philosophizing which started with Plato, when in his dia-
logue Republic, he placed the value of mathematical 
knowledge only next to the dialectics as the characteristic 
way of philosophizing.17 
Thus it is not the oddness that needs to be resolved in 
order to fix the argument of this paper’s line of investiga-
tion. This oddness is not a conceptual weakness but a his-
torical indicator of our being too accustomed to view 
mathematics as an essentially defined scientific discipline. 
On contrary, it is institutionally and historically deter-
mined. A counterpart of such a discipline in case of (iii) 
above would be the one which sets historical texts as its 
subject matter or it would be the discipline that would de-
scribe the human competence for historical textualizing.  
This would nothing other than universal hermeneutics. 
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4. Concluding Remarks and Suggestions with Peda-
gogical Ends 
 
Our conceptions of mathematics matter when it comes to 
mathematical pedagogy, whether we are concerned with 
designing or improving curriculum, or trying to address 
teaching related methodological issues. It is customary 
treat mathematics as a body of established knowledge 
with sound and certain epistemological foundations of 
logicist, formalist or Platonist type. This gives the impres-
sion that one just has to master the method and conceptual 
apparatus to the extent that mathematics becomes pre-
dominantly a mechanical endeavor, which starts with 
logical definitions followed by examples and related theo-
rems. The very organization of undergraduate and gradu-
ate university education of mathematics bears witness to 
this.18 
The investigations pursued in this paper develop an al-
ternative perspective on viewing what mathematics is all 
about. This is constituted by hermeneutical reflections to 
the extent that the author has mainly tried to work out the 
interpretive framework under which mathematics can 
make sense from the angle of applicability and not from 
abstract philosophical theorizing. The interpretive frame-
work is the very parallelism between Pythagoreanism as 
anthropocentrism and practices of regional hermeneutics 
towards an all-encompassing universal hermeneutics. I 
propose that a stronger work in this direction is possible. 
Instead of just parallelism, a hermeneutic-phenomeno-
logical correlation is possible. But this would involve a 
deconstructive historical ontology of Heideggerian type 
of the historical significance of mathematics, i.e. a her-
meneutic-phenomenological examination of the role of 
mathematics in all human expressions, philosophy, sci-
ences, culture and art throughout in history This is a huge 
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1 This use of the term Platonism encompasses (although inclusively) its 
classical origin in Plato’s metaphysics as the world of forms. This was a 
particular case of metaphysical realism. Modern versions of Platonisms 
are all realisms that mostly remain silent about the exact nature of meta-
physical existence of such independence. Mostly their point of departure 
is the pioneering semantic analysis of mathematical concepts and state-
ments as pursued by Frege’s logicist Platonism (Dummet, 1991, pp. 
303). From this point onwards, this study will not distinguish between 
realism and Platonism.  
2 Hermeneutics mainly refers to the art of interpretation. Its specialized 
or regional modifications involve literary, legal, Biblical and philologi-
cal (Hirsch, 1967, p. vii). Unless prefixed by the word ‘regional’ or spe-
cialized, hermeneutics would always be meant in a more philosophical 
sense as pioneered by Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey.  
3 Former is a logicist-Platonist (Steiner, 1998, p. 21ff) in context of the 
semantical analysis of mathematical objects and relations which he finds 
perfectly in accord with Fregean semantics, whereas the latter is a nomi-
nalist with formalist bent. Also, Steiner’s Platonism is a kind of restric-
ted Platonism (thus we have the qualification: logicist-Platonism) in the 
sense that according to him, Fregean semantical analysis of mathemati-
cal concepts is restricted to the application of mathematical concepts in 
general as second-order predicative relations the extension of which 
includes physical concepts as first-order predicative relations. The focus 
of Fregean semantic analysis was never the application of mathematical 
concepts to natural objects but only the logical validity by virtue of 
which second-order reasoning become applicable to first-order reaso-
ning. Thus as Frege himself regarded mathematical object in general as, 
“they are the laws of the laws of nature”. Steiner on the other hand is 
concerned with how mathematical concepts together apply to nature 
itself in context of lawfully describing the physical phenomena and how 
they become predictable (Steiner, 1998, p. 25).  
4 The suspension of judgment with any kind of metaphysical positing 
has been recognized primarily by phenomenology as a legitimate star-
ting for any radical investigation. Usually Dilthey’s hermeneutics is not 
considered to be correlated with phenomenology, especially when he 
started to view Husserlian transcendental phenomenology more criti-
 




cally. This is certainly not the place to work out how much phenomeno-
logy is a presupposition for Dilthey’s hermeneutics. However, it I not 
difficult to see how phenomenological reduction which first and fore-
most aims at overcoming metaphysical positing as a result of ‘epoche’ 
which is a phenomenological consequence of adhering to the phenome-
nological maxim “back to things themselves” (Husserl,  2001, p. 88), 
and making Husserl’s principle of all principles (Husserl, 1983, p. 44) as 
its point of departure, logically correlates with Dilthey’s own principle 
of all principles that renders consciousness as what determines beings-
as-beings (Dilthey, 2002, p. 247). 
5 Pythagoreanism amounts to the doctrine that the natural kinds are e-
xactly what are determined by mathematical kinds. Steiner worked out 
many such formalist and non-formalist mathematical analogies to exem-
plify his concept at different nth-order. I am omitting the general strategy 
and examples of them as they require most advanced understanding of 
both theoretical physics and geometric methods which is beyond the 
scope of this paper. See chapter 4 for a detailed construction of them.  
6 In order to avoid confusion with the concept of ‘analogy’, I would be 
using the word parallel or parallelism.   
7 This is a simplified version of strategy (1) of 1st order non-formalist 
Pythagorean analogy. There are at least 6 general strategies for both 
formalist and non-formalist type. 
8 See also (Myres, 2014, p. 30ff) and (Dilthey, The Rise of 
Hermeneutics, 1996b) for this principle and its role in determining ca-
nonical texts from classics. Principle of analogy has been used extensi-
vely, although with varying degree of conceptualizing; throughout in the 
practice of philology, see (Verburg, 1998) for detail, which also includes 
the Alexandrian School. 
9 Steiner had to resort to the aesthetics of anthropocentrism as the ulti-
mate basis instead of a sound epistemology (Steiner, 1998, p. 55ff).   
10 For instance, existence of Omega minus particle was posited merely 
as a result of mathematical symmetry that existed between SU(2) to 
SU(3). This was immediately believed to be existent, and later was inde-
ed found to be existent! This is not just one instance! There are nume-
rous such instances in which an object is claimed merely by virtue of 
some analogy from mathematics and is later found to be existent. There 
is no sufficient justification for all this. But it shows how theoretical 
physics is such a taxonomy or the the nexus by virtue of which things 
comes to be in language. See (Steiner, 1998) for more examples. On the 
other hand, classical philology brought classical texts (like Homer’s I-
liad and Odyssey, Hesiod’s Theogony) along with the historical Homer 
and Hesiod whose historical existence as single author was always 
pretty much contestable, see (Myres, 2014, p. 30) 
11 I am using this phrase ‘human sciences’ as the translation of Dilthey’s 
term Geisteswissenschaften which encompasses the disciplinary do-
mains of both Arts & Humanities (Performing Arts , Literary Studies, 
Linguistics, etc.) and Social Sciences (Sociology, Political Sciences, 
Anthropology, etc.) as generally held in modern universities. So, whe-
never this term is used throughout in this paper, its all-inclusive mea-
nings should be taken. See the trans. /ed. note in (Dilthey, The 
Imagination of the Poet: Elements for a Poetics, 1985, p. 36n) 
12 Restricted in the sense that the discourse of human science after all 
involves specialized vocabulary that modifies natural language into a 
particular language game. 
13 Hermeneutics for Dilthey (and Schleiermacher as well) is always con-
cerned with interpreting written monuments. Thus it was first seen as 
generalizing regional hermeneutics (Dilthey, The Rise of Hermeneutics, 
1996b) 
14 See (Dilthey, The Understanding of Other Persons and Their 
Expressions of Life, 1977) for the detailed interpretive account of Ver-
stehen and (Dilthey, Schleiermacher's Hermeneutical System in Relation 
to Earlier Protestant Hermeneutics, 1996a) for how much Dilthey him-
self owes to Schleiermacher.  
15 I am fully consciousness of a threat of logical circularity in this last 
statement. But the circularity is only apparent as far as its logical sense 
is concerned, for it is hermeneutic circularity that exhibits here in the 
repetition of ‘history’ and the ‘historical’. Former is part and the latter is 
the whole. Former is determined by historical texts as historical human 
actions through which latter as the all-encompassing nexus of human 
existence shows itself. See the detail of hermeneutic circle in (Scholtz, 
2015, p. 65) 
16 20th century renowned mathematician and a significant contributor to 
the discipline of both algebraic topology and Homological algebra in 
pure mathematics along with Cartan Eilenberg and Alexander Steenrod 
17 Cf. (Plato, Republic, 1997, pp. 1129-1131 (509d-511e)) for divided-
line analogy, also, see (Plato, Republic, 1997, pp. 1132-1137 (512a-
520a)) and (Plato, 1997, p. 484-494 (201d-212c)) for how Plato makes 
 
 
sense of the intellectual journey towards the encounter with reality alle-
gorically which correlates with former. 
18 Author himself has more than 12 years of teaching experience in ma-
thematics at university level. 
